By Marco Octávio de Meneses
Introduction
For months after the attacks of October 7th, analysts have been asking whether or not the Israel-Hamas war would spread to the broader region of the Middle East. In this text, I shall argue that spillover in the area is unlikely, and there is not an escalatory tendency leading to spillover. For many actors, there are few incentives to see the conflict escalate. First off: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE have been involved ever since the start of the conflict in negotiations to try and bring that conflict to an end (Reuters, 2024a). Iran became involved after responding to an Israeli strike in their embassy in Syria that killed seven people, including two top Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) commanders (Regan Qiblawi, Aslkhshali, 2024). Even the United States of America (US) has been engaged in trying to contain the conflict.
However, Israel may drive escalation, be it in the interest of the country or not. This is due to the political orientation of the prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Simultaneously, US President Joe Biden has clearly stated to Israel that a military assault on Rafah would be unacceptable (Al Jazeera, 2024) without a plan to protect civilians (NPR, 2024). Israel and Hezbollah are involved in exchanging airstrikes, rockets, and tank fire for at least a year, though Hezbollah appears unwilling to increase the level of violence. The Houthis, in the south of Yemen, have resorted to attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea, and Hamas would benefit from a long conflict, as part of their strategy of accepting civilian deaths to further their cause [1] . Finally, it is important to mention that the United Kingdom (UK), alongside the US, helped negotiate a possible cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas, which was mediated by Egypt and Qatar (Pamuk, Cornwell, Magid, 2024). This shows US influence and regional desire to reduce hostilities.
I argue that, even in a world of declining US power, there is still room for the US to shape policy in the Middle East by means of deterrence and dissuasion, even in regard to Israel. Finally, the regional desire for escalation is extremely low, thus helping alleviate fears. Even though a number of actors don’t want a spillover, there are still variables that can draw the region into wider conflict. For example, the US still has a sizable presence in the Middle East. A strike in a US military base could prompt a reaction out of the US, even if unwanted (Kaye and Vakil, 2024). The other factor is if Israel acts disregarding its allies by moving into Rafah, alienating a necessary lifeline.
Regional context
As Kaye and Vakil argue, the Middle East went through a reset of relations in the past decade: Israel’s relations with Arab and Non-Arab neighbors were normalizing, mainly due to economic opportunities and the US reducing their role in the region, shifting resources towards Asia. Surprisingly, the war between Israel and Hamas did not destroy the relationships created during the normalization period (Kaye and Vakil, 2024). Relations with Saudi Arabia, an important geopolitical player in the region, went to a halt during the war, and restarting the process requires a path to a Palestinian State (Reuters, 2024c). Israel also has maintained relations with the participants of the 2020 Abraham Accords (the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), which involved recognizing the state of Israel and establishing full diplomatic relations.
Things become trickier regarding Iran. Meneses (2024) shows that relations between Iran and the US are at a low point, as guarantees that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons disappear. Relations between Iran and Gulf states appear to be rebuilding after a Chinese-brokered deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. On the Iranian side, the deal was part of a larger strategy of having better relations with neighbors to reduce the effect of Western sanctions. Saudi Arabia benefits from the stabilization effect of the deal, allowing them to pursue their own goals. Nevertheless, Iran-backed groups, like the Houthis in Yemen, to the south of Saudi Arabia, continue to worry the Saudis. Iran’s ability to threaten peace through its proxies is cause for concern, still, relations between the two countries are holding, even after months of the Israel-Hamas conflict (Dagres, 2024).
Resilience seems to be the norm for interstate relations in the Middle East. Dagres (2024), Kaye, and Vakil (2024) all show that initiatives are coming out of the region with or without US involvement. Meneses (2024), Vakil, and Kaye (2024) all show limited room for the US and allies to exercise influence in the Middle East, however, there are triggers for increased US involvement and even tools that the US has but is not using. Attacks on American citizens and military bases may create pressure to increase military involvement in the region. The US can also try cutting, or interrupting the supply of missiles and ammunition, as done on the 7th of May, in an attempt to influence Israeli policy (NBC, 2024).
Escalation
Escalation is defined as a situation in which one of the parties involved in the conflict believes that there has been a significant qualitative change in the conflict (Cliff, 2023). Ways to do that include utilizing different types of weapons, striking different types of targets, striking new territories, or anything else that would make an actor perceive the conflict as escalated, such as a political declaration (ibid.). Let it be noted that wars tend towards escalation, because escalation can be used as a tool and can happen accidentally, but de-escalation seldom happens by accident (ibid.). Additionally, wars typically end because of compromise or a settlement, but the political objectives that lead a country to war rarely change, except under “extreme duress” (ibid.).
That said, Israel finds itself in escalation dominance, Hamas has no tools with which it can escalate the conflict after the targets and methods used in the attacks of October 7th, though Israel can’t leverage its dominance to coerce Hamas: increasing the level of violence doesn’t bring Israel any closer to its initial objective: the complete elimination of the terrorist group. Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that that is Israel's goal in this war, and that goal hasn’t changed (BBC, 2024). Assuming that war is a continuation of politics through other means (Clausewitz, 1976, p.87), we have to think of the following: Hamas took a violent course of action on October 7th because the status quo was deemed unacceptable and no other means were adequate to pursue their goals. Similarly, Israel committed to a war, because for them, it was unacceptable for Hamas to do what they did, and the goal to eliminate Hamas is, as shown in the previous paragraph, extremely unlikely to change. That unwavering commitment will undoubtedly stall negotiations and lead to even more human suffering.
As mentioned in the last section, other countries in the region are working to reduce tensions and de-escalate, avoiding a spillover. The incentives for avoiding it are clear: they don’t want war on their territory. But, what can they do? Egypt and Qatar are currently mediating a cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas (Pamuk, Cornwell, Magid, 2024). After Israel targeted the Iranian embassy in Syria, killing seven people, including two IRGC commanders (Regan Qiblawi, Aslkhshali, 2024), Iran retaliated with a barrage of missiles and drones, which could show the intent to escalate, but in reality, the desire to escalate was not there. Iran announced the time and date, and knew of Israel’s missile defense capabilities, striking valuable targets inside Israel would inevitably prompt a reaction from Israel, potentially locking the two in a tit-for-tat with increasing violence (Bergman, Fassihi, Schmitt, 2024). The Kingdom of Jordan shot down Iranian missiles flying over their airspace (Helou, 2024), and Saudi Arabia and the UAE relayed intelligence about the Iranian attack (The…, 2024). This indicates that other players in the region don’t want to see Israel in a position where they have to respond, potentially causing Iran to get involved, promoting a spillover in the region. After that, the Israeli reaction appeared to be calibrated to avoid further escalation, causing no casualties (Reuters, 2024d).
As for non-State actors in the region such as Hezbollah, in the past, have responded to deterrence, that is, dissuasion by threat (Mazarr, 2018). Israel’s northern border with Lebanon hasn’t witnessed an increasing level of violence. Israel certainly doesn’t want another front in the war and Hezbollah has been deterred in two ways: denial and punishment. Deterrence by denial occurs when an adversary has little reason to think their policy will work because the target already has adequate defenses. Deterrence by threat occurs when there is good reason to fear the punishment from the attacked state. In the past, Israel has punished Hezbollah’s attack to an extent that their leadership regretted the attack (Hezbollah.., 2009), perhaps there is already a logic of deterrence operating there even though the two exchange rocket fire.
Finally, the Houthis did participate in escalating the conflict, by targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea, and seemed to be undeterred by the threat of military force against them. On the other hand, their reach is limited. The group has stated that commercial vessels heading toward Israel will be targeted, and even struck Israeli territory, causing zero casualties (Bermudez,2024). On the other hand, they are involved in a protracted Civil War, limiting the amount of resources they can spend on fighting Israel. Thus, it is hard to say whether the Houthis would further escalate this conflict.
In sum, many regional actors are engaged in trying to keep the conflict between Israel and Hamas relatively contained. Simultaneously, there are initiatives coming out of the region to build peace, and in the short term, a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas, signaling that spillover is against their interests.
American influence in the Middle East
Although their influence is declining with regard to the region in general, especially Iran, the US still holds significant power in the region, because of their influence on Israeli policy. By this point, there is little the US and its allies can do to shape Iranian policy regarding the application of force (Meneses (2024) shows the limits of force application in Iran). Theoretically, policy can also be shaped with incentives. However, offering opportunities for cooperation seems completely out of the picture, due to the state of US-Iran relations. And, even if there were an opportunity to influence Iranian policy, it would be unlikely that Iran-backed militant groups in the region would bow to Iran’s wishes. Netanyahu cannot act with a complete disregard for US interests in the region, either because they need US support, or because Israeli citizens know they rely on allies for their defense.
It is not just a matter of declining influence, the United States of America has been trying to move away from providing security (or attempting to) in the Middle East and leaving that role up to the region. The US is mostly concerned with China (COMMURI, 2023), but there are still “trip-wires” that can increase US involvement in the region. There are still many American military bases in the Middle East that have even suffered strikes after the start of the Israel-Hamas war. The attacks against US forces caused casualties, which prompted the US government to retaliate, which, in turn, led Iran to advise Iraqi groups to tone down attacks on US bases (Rasheed, Hafezi, Azhari, 2024). To put things clearly, the logic in play is that striking targets increases the risk of retaliation, creating an escalatory tendency that can get out of hand.
The US has many bases, thus, many vulnerabilities to be targeted, so caution must be exercised, as Iran did in alerting Iraqi groups to tone down attacks against the US. Additionally, the possibility of US retaliation can be used as a means of deterrence by threat: the military bases the US has in the Middle East can be used as a trip-wire force, signaling a commitment to act if attacked. This deterrent logic has already helped to keep the level of conflict low after Iran alerted Iraqi groups.
Finally, the main way the US can help shape policy in the Middle East is via Israel. Israel cannot be without allies, and they know it. Currently, the US is not employing its full range of policy tools to shape Israeli behavior (Kaye and Vakil, 2024), and, as I have argued above, Israel may be the one behind escalation, or at least not reducing the level of violence. For example, a cease-fire deal mediated by Egypt and Qatar was on the table, but Hamas and Israel could not come to an agreement. Now, a truce is extremely unlikely, as Netanyahu promises to move into Rafah with or without a deal (BBC, 2024). The US has established its red line with regard to an assault in the city, reiterating the need for a humanitarian plan (Reuters, 2024e). But they also have an unwavering commitment to the defense of the State of Israel. One of the available tools to exert pressure is by saying that if Israel moves into Rafah, they will receive less military support from the US.
Conclusion
I have argued that there is not an escalatory tendency in the region, that is not to say that escalation will not happen. Different targets in countries that have not been attacked, or reckless non-state actors may instigate further escalation in the region. Escalation can even happen due to political declarations of leaders in the region or by accident. Still, much of the diplomacy and even military action has been dedicated to avoiding spillover and escalation. Finally, I also argued that, even in a world of diminishing US influence, there is still room for shaping policy in the Middle East and unused tools that the US has to do so.
[1] A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report establishes systematic use of human-shields by Hamas and deliberate mixing of Hamas military installations close to (or under) civilian infrastructure. The strategy is: increasing the number of civilian deaths in the case of attack makes for a PR loss for Israel, turning public opinion against them - which may be working (Aday et al., 2019). Additionally, Hamas has told civilians to ignore Israeli military calls for evacuation (Reuters, 2024b).
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