Can the United States and China reduce tensions?
Can the United States and China reduce tensions?
By Marco Octávio de Meneses
Introduction
Recently, United States of America (US) president Joe Biden has gone to New Delhi, India, to attend the G20 meetings, and Hanoi, Vietnam. During these trips, the American president has called for reducing tensions with China. Relations between the superpowers have soured over the last year, due to economic tit-for-tat measures between the two countries (Council…, 2022), the spy weather balloon episode (Ribgy, 2023), and tensions over Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China (Bose and Hunnicut, 2023). Biden has since called for stability in the US-China relationship (Hellmore, 2023). But, is there a way things can cool down between these superpowers in the long term? Is there something that fundamentally drives them towards tension, maybe even war, making any reduction of tension merely temporary?
In this text, I argue that due to Chinese strategic culture and the American policy of integrated deterrence in the South China Sea (SCS), these global powers will become stuck in tit-for-tat dynamics that lead to tension. There are ‘vital interests’ at stake for both sides, and at each step, the policy answers the mutual threat they pose to each other. Economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence are possible ways of reducing tension, although, as I argue, they can also increase tensions.
Possible approaches
International Relations theory can provide a few different answers to this conundrum. For example, scholars such as John Mearsheimer think that hegemonic war is inevitable. The logic behind that is: States are afraid of other States, because they live in an environment where self-help is their best shot at survival. This leads States to maximize their share of world power, and always pursue that goal, because they do not know how much power they will need to be safe in the future. If this view is true, then, as long as China keeps growing economically, increasing military capabilities, challenging the US in technology and attempting to shape international norms, then war is on the horizon (Williams, 2008).
Some scholars reject that China acts according to that view, for Shih and Huang (2020), China’s international action is a result of their world view. For them, China sees the world as different actors seeking an advantage in harmony. Self-performance, and not competition, characterize this power seeking. The Chinese power project relies on the world recognizing China as being more beneficial to them than the US. This does not mean that aggressive action is off the menu, but that the end goal for China is some form of coexistence. Utilizing an analogy with Weiqi (or Go, as the Japanese call it), an ancient game where players compete for territory on a grid. Sometimes, disengaging from conflict in one area of the board is good, because territory is counted equally, so going to different parts of the board gives you more territory. This is emblematic of the Chinese view: strengthening more relationships is good for Chinese power, be it in Africa, Asia or Latin America, in areas where the US has less investment. For these authors, the lack of head-on confrontation, and self-perception make China incompatible with mainstream IR theory.
Game of go
Similarly, Nathan Levine (2023) looks at the perceptions actors have of each other. However, he finds that the US and China have fundamental and irreconcilable value disagreements. On the American side, spreading human rights, the rule of law, liberal capitalism and democracy (universal values) is necessary. Nations that do not fit those criteria tend to be seen as a threat. When you add that China does not conform to those attributes, and has ever growing capabilities, the US sees them as a threat. The Chinese, on the other hand, are sure that the US is trying to enact regime change in China (because they are not a liberal democracy), given their interventionist tendencies, and are even more frightened by the idea of competition. For the liberal, competition describes a somewhat peaceful state of affairs where actors attempt to maximize their comparative advantages, resulting in the greater good. For the marxist, it comes down to a struggle of life and death, wherein the weak perish. Levine then concludes that these differing views make it impossible for a mutually acceptable narrative to describe the US-China relationship, resulting in an ideologically driven security dilemma (Levine, 2023).
I argue that the best way to approach this problem is through the lens of strategic culture: a set of narratives, analogies, axioms and causal understandings that establish long-lasting preferences (Feng, He, 2021). The concept is made of strategy and culture, and attempts to understand how States react to threats, scholars that use this concept argue there is a filter between threats and foreign policy output. Strategic culture is a part of that filter. Feng and He (2021) argue that Chinese strategic culture is built on two main cultural traditions: Confucianism and realpolitik. The former is based on non-intervention, pacifism, non-violence and civility. The latter is based on offensive action, preemptive even. These authors understand that under high levels of threat, China’s realpolitik-oriented thinking emerges, under medium levels of threat, there is subdued aggression, and under low levels, Confucianism is predominant.
I adopt the previous framework to understand Chinese action. However, it must be understood that threats exist apart from strategic culture. There will be no speculation of how States decide what counts as a threat and what doesn’t, I assume that there are vital interests that, when harmed, count as a threat. For example, attacks against sovereignty or territorial integrity rank high among threats (and these sorts of threats will be the most relevant).
Thus, I adopt a neoclassical realist lens, as described in Ripsman (2016). He contends that, while systemic stimuli are significant for State action, they pass through a domestic filter, which consists of: strategic culture, state-society relations, leader images and domestic institutions as intervening variables. As mentioned, I shall focus on strategic culture.
Pushing each other's buttons
China has a few vital geostrategic interests in Southeast Asia, and especially, the SCS. They consist of: upholding sovereignty, controlling the Nine-dash line (maritime territory claimed by China) and achieving stability. The US, on the other hand, seeks economic and diplomatic access to Southeast Asian countries, upholds the principle of freedom of navigation (FON), individual rights, respect of the rule of law and other liberal democratic ideas (Lynch, Przystup and Saunders, 2020).
In a document emitted in May of this year, the Chinese government laid out their position on what they called ‘US. Coercive Diplomacy’. This document criticized American action since the end of WW2, attacking their use of the dollar as a tool of statecraft, military interventions, invasions, using media and science as covert means of ideological infiltration, among other things (America’s…, 2023). On top of that, it has been argued that US calls for ‘change through trade’ in China are perceived as threats of regime change, making China fear the US (Levine, 2023).
On the other side, the US really was committed to the idea of change through trade, integrating China into global institutions to promote liberalism inside China. As it became clear that change through trade was not happening, China became a competitor, a ‘revisionist power’ (Lynch, Przystup and Saunders, 2020). When you factor in China’s aggression in the SCS with the economic, technological and military capabilities they have been building, it appears to make good strategic sense to dedicate more resources to Asia. In 2023, with the trip to Vietnam, the reaffirmation of the Camp David principles with Japan and South Korea, as well as military exercises with the Philippines, the US has cemented their military strategy of integrated deterrence (Farinha, 2023) against the ‘China Threat’. It should be noted that Vietnam is by no means aligned to the US, they maintain an independent Foreign Policy, seeking benefits from China, the US, Russia and other countries. Thu (2023) argued that Vietnam is merely placing a ‘hedge’ with the Americans.
Part of Chinese vital interest is territory held or claimed by other countries, such as Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, etc. (Feng, He, 2021). So, when China pursues these objectives, other countries perceive aggression, which may lead more countries to ‘hedge’ with the Americans. There is a tit-for-tat logic: Chinese aggression makes other countries want to balance against them, and makes the US increase their military presence in the SCS. For the Chinese, this is a threat, and, as Feng and He argue, when a high level of threat is perceived in China, realpolitik starts to show. What makes this even scarier is that for the Chinese, a pre-emptive strike is not off the menu when under threat, it may even be desirable (Feng, He, 2021).
So, the US bets on integrated deterrence, that is, strengthening conventional military capabilities with allies,, which makes China scared. If Shih and Huang are correct, perhaps China will look to other parts of the world and attempt to gain influence there, because that would be an appropriate strategy in a game of Weiqi. This seems implausible, as it would require turning your head away from a vital interest.
Attempts of stabilization?
During the G20 summit, Biden engaged in dialogue with premier Li Qiang, from China, in which they discussed, among other things, the need for stability (Bose, 2023). It is important to note that the US is more engaged in the Pacific. Security initiatives are revamped with South Korea, Japan and the Philippines. This is, in part, a reflection of how other countries of the region perceive China’s increasingly aggressive action in the South China Sea. After the visit to Vietnam, China has accused the US of having a “Cold War Mentality” (BBC, 2023). Biden, called for stability and assured he is not trying to contain China (Hellmore, 2023).
Both leaders have called for either stability or peaceful coexistence. But, can you cool things down with words? Barry O’Neill defines tension as a “shared worry about an imminent conflict” (1998, p.63). States must convince the other that conflict is not imminent, then some level of stability can be brought to the relationship. Can that be done?
During his Asian tour, Biden visited Vietnam, elevating the relationship of their countries to a strategic partnership. Militarily, China has reasons to be concerned with what could be enemy forces in the case of a war, because of the contested territorial claims in the region, many of which are contained in the nine-dash line. The US cannot see eye-to-eye with China in this respect: the Chinese are involved in violations of International Law and seek to expand their territory. The US seeks to counter this by strengthening ties with allies in the region. It would be extremely difficult to assure that conflict is not coming, because there are irreconcilable differences.
Now, for the tricky bit: the US tries to uphold their universal values and interests, such as the promotion of individual rights and liberal democracy in Taiwan, this angers China. China claims the self-governing Island as part of their territory. Yet another instance of a fundamental disagreement, in which neither country can see eye-to-eye. Can there be reconciliation? It would appear that only military dissuasion is up for the task. As mentioned above, the US is tackling this objective by enhancing regional allies’ capabilities and cultivating interoperability with different armed forces in the SCS (Wall…, 2023). Undoubtedly, this angers China, the realpolitik strand of their strategic culture will kick in, leading to more aggressiveness on the Chinese side. This can get risky. If this logic is left to continue, war seems inevitable, however, things may not be so dim.
Economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence
Even though the US seeks to ‘de-risk’ their economic relations with China, there is no eliminating interdependence, even policy elites recognizes this (Demarais, 2023). So, even after attempting to create a ‘small yard with a tall fence’, as Biden put it, interdependence will persist. Does that mean war between them is unthinkable, or irrational?
Economic interdependence can be a mitigating factor, however, it does not preclude the possibility of war. According to Tanious (2019), interdependence can reduce the frequency, and intensity of the conflict. Furthermore, Copeland (2015) argues that this issue is best understood through the Trade expectations model, that is: interdependence can lead to peace if the most dependent State expects that they will have access to trade, capital, markets and critical materials (leading to development). If the most dependent State expects that they will lose access to those factors, then security measures are in order, because the development (and power) of the most dependent State is at risk. These risk-minimizing measures can take the form of military action in their region to ensure trade will continue to take place, preserving State power. Accordingly, the least dependent State in the relationship may perceive that as a threat, potentially leading to a downwards spiral. If war is seen as a way to stop more relative power loss, then it is likely that the most dependent State will wage war (Copeland, 2015). In sum, interdependence can't be trusted to prevent war. It can even make it more likely.
So, can the world at least rely on nuclear deterrence to keep the peace? First of all, there is no stated policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) between China and the US as there was between the USSR and the US during the Cold War. Secondly, we must differentiate between low-yield and high-yield nuclear weapons. Low-yield (tactical) nuclear weapons release less than 25 kilotons of energy when detonated. For reference, the nuclear bomb dropped in Hiroshima exploded with the energy of 15 kilotons. These devices are designed to win a battle, not a war (Tactical…, 2022). For an operational theater in the South Pacific, due to the lower risk of escalation, tactical nuclear weapons are preferred. Currently, the US lags behind China in their ability to use these weapons if war breaks out in the SCS (PETERS, 2023). In terms of high-yield, or strategic, nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that China and the US can destroy each other. However, this may not matter if China thinks it can get away with a tactical nuke first strike to achieve strategic objectives in the SCS.
There are three ways the US can to respond to this imbalance: expand US and US allies capabilities (bringing enemy nuclear weapons to China’s doorstep, risky, given Chinese strategic culture); engaging in arms control; or allow China to keep that superiority, and trust conventional military capabilities to deter aggression. As stated, the first option can prompt aggression out of China while they still perceive an advantage, but it seems to be an appropriate course of action for the US, as a balancing act. The second option is out of question, China has no intention of engaging in these sorts of agreements with the US (BONNER, 2023). Finally, only relying on conventional military deterrence goes against logic, as it does not impose significant cost on a nuclear first-strike. Nor is it suggested by the U.S. Naval Institute, Com. Paul S. Giarra argues that Sea-Launched Cruise missiles, delivered from a surface fleet or submarines are the best way to achieve deterrence (Time…, 2023). Again, this move by the US can instigate a major reaction from China in the form of preemptive action.
Conclusion
No matter how much tensions can be temporarily reduced between the US and China, it appears that there is a structural drive that puts them against one another. This drive consists of non-reconcilable vital interests, as well as differences in strategic culture and threat perception. Tensions between the US and China will rise unless China becomes a liberal democracy that promotes human rights, or the US becomes comfortable with decreasing their share of world power. Since aggressive policies in the SCS elicit more aggressive policies, tensions are bound to increase. War may not be inevitable, but, excluding a change of heart, they always consider each other as a threat, leading to a growth in tensions.
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