Macron's Statements on Taiwan: Assessing Strengths, Weaknesses, and Implications for EU Unity and Global Power Rivalry
By Marco Octávio de Meneses
Macron’s statements
From April 5-8th, French president Emmanuel Macron, along with European Commission president Ursula Von der Leyen, visited China. By bringing along a business delegation (mainly French), it was clear that trade and investments would be on the agenda. However, the trip also intended to display European unity, by having contrasting approaches to China represented in Mrs. Von der Leyen’s more hawkish stance, counterbalanced by Mr. Macron’s more dovish stance (THE…, 2023). Not surprisingly, business wasn’t the only dish on the menu, Chinese president Xi Jinping’s position on the war in Ukraine and partnership with Russia was also meant to be discussed (PAPATOLIOS, 2023).
On April 7th, China launched a military drill simulating the encircling of Taiwan, the independently governed island that China claims as their own (CNN, 2023). The following day, Mr. Macron was asked to comment on the matter, to which he replied with:
“The paradox would be that, overcome with panic, we believe we are just America’s followers[...] is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.” (Wall…, 2023).
Essentially, the Frenchman's position revolves around having more autonomy vis-à-vis the US’ position. Officially, the Americans support the status quo, being in favor of peaceful solutions to controversies between Taiwan and China, while also making available defense capabilities should Taiwan’s self-sufficiency be threatened. All without defending Taiwanese independence. (U.S., 2022). Mr. Macron’s opinion contrasts with that of the EU, and with that of other member States, prompting some commentators to point to the event as disunity in the EU, something that China can exploit.
These were attitudes towards Taiwan. As for China, the EU and the US have contrasting approaches. The strategies preferred by the US and the EU are decoupling and De-risking, respectively. Decoupling consists of curbing China’s access to critical technology by removing supply chains from Chinese territory, creating two separate economic spheres (ALROY, 2023). De-risking seeks to maintain relations with China, but remove some of the risks of dealing with a strategic competitor. De-risking can involve policies such as limiting Chinese investment in some areas in Europe, as well as subsidies to European firms so they can stay competitive vis-à-vis Chinese competitors (THE…,2023).
Conversely, I argue that this display of contrasting opinions does not carry much significance for the unity of the bloc, even though Mr. Macron has stuck to his statement (FRANCE24, 2023). My argument is threefold: the tendencies promoting unity in the bloc are far stronger than those promoting disunity, so the threat of disunity is overstated. Additionally, Macron need not worry, complete alignment with the US is not coming back, and there is space for strategic autonomy, even if some alignment with the US exists. After defending those arguments, I move on to describe what the US and China, the global powers of the day, gain from a more unified or disunified EU and how the EU should act. Macron’s answer to the interviewer is used as a platform to enter a larger discussion of fragmentation and Strategic Autonomy.
How strong are forces for fragmentation in the EU?
Commentators responsible for the opinions expressed in Wall…(2023), The…(2023) and Politico (2023a, 2023b) seem to overestimate the threat posed by Macron’s statement. There are forces that indicate some amount of disunity in the EU, Von der Leyen seems hawkish on China than Macron, for example. However, EU CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) decisions are still bound by intergovernmental rather than supranational factors. This means that disagreements of States between themselves and the EU are somewhat common, and not really new. Moreover, the EU is not a State, and international players know this. It’s not unheard of to see States clash within the union. Even so, a fragmented EU may benefit China, which is the case if you identify two main poles in the current international system, one led by the US and the other by China. Since the EU falls on the US’ side, a weaker EU would mean the US has a weaker ally, thus, increasing China’s relative standing. That is not what you want after you label a country as your “strategic competitor” (EUROPEAN C…, 2019)
The risk of fragmentation is less credible when the following factors are taken into account: de-risking economic relations with China seems to be of interest to France and Germany, the two biggest economies in the EU. Moreover, reducing risks has been a drive ever more present in EU policy, especially after the supply-chain disruption engendered by the Covid-19 pandemic and the panic generated by too much dependence on Russian natural gas. This trend can be seen with the aim to process crucial materials necessary for renewable energy, removing the need for third countries (SOUTH…, 2023). De-risking has become preferable to decoupling for the Europeans. The crucial difference between those strategies is that the first seeks to explore economic complementarities with China, since the economy of the EU has developed interdependence ties with the Asian dragon. Decoupling was the approach adopted by the US, which seeks to reduce Chinese tech advances by completely separating US firms and Chinese firms in key supply-chain, such as military technology and advanced semiconductors (FOREIGN…, 2023).
There is further evidence supporting the idea of reducing risks, but significantly reducing ties with China would bring economic ruin to the EU, especially for Germany and France (REUTERS, 2023)(LÜDTKE,2020). It must be said that these economic powerhouses in Europe are more in line with de-risking than Italy and Spain, for example, further evidence of fragmentation (FRISBIE, 2023). On the other hand, convergence between the biggest economies is more relevant than their disagreement with smaller economies. Germany can exercise leadership in the EU, especially in the realm of the CFSP, and there is evidence to support that a consensus can be reached. We can look at a few examples, like when Germany engaged with EU member States to enforce the sanctions imposed on Iran in 2009, mediating between stronger and weaker EU member States; or working together with France and Poland, the Weimar triangle, to produce powerful policy propositions; or having moderate policies towards delicate issues, so that there is an alternative more States can get behind.(WRIGHT, 2018). These contingencies should alleviate discomfort about the existence of contrasting approaches in the CFSP.
Currently, the biggest unifying factor, and main issue for the EU, is the war in Ukraine. This event has brought western countries together in support for Ukraine, and, more broadly, a rules-based international order, defined by democracy, rule-of-law and civil liberties. A publication in the European Council on Foreign Relations collected opinion polls, showing that support for Ukraine grew, and views on Russia became increasingly adversarial. There are caveats, though. This trend is contingent on inflation not getting out of control and Ukraine’s military performance, not to mention the threat of a politicization of migrants, creating more rifts between left and right (ECFR, 2023).
The largest economies in the EU would like to continue business with China, even though they might have some disagreements. But, since these players do agree, it is safe to say that Europe trends towards staying united. At least for the time being.
Complete alignment with the US is not coming back
It would appear that the French president continues to express the age-old concern of Strategic Autonomy, something that has always been present in European policy, now with growing importance. The idea of Strategic Autonomy can be summarized as the idea of not having dependencies that stifle Europe’s options in strategically relevant areas (EUROPEAN…, 2022). Europe’s alignment with the US is undeniable, to an extent, but it is important to look at some forces that point to its reduction, as well as points of divergence between EU and US policy.
The conditions that lead to US alignment, on the systemic level, come down to a few main aspects: a reliable security guarantee, technology transfers and investment in European firms. This alignment took shape after the end of World War 2, and continued up until around the 2008 financial crisis. Notwithstanding the alignment, there was room for Europe to pursue some autonomy, developing their own agenda and seeking normative action in the international system (LAVERY, SCHMID, 2021).
Especially after the 2008 crisis, the aforementioned conditions began to disappear. During the Obama administration, Europe’s strategic importance was seen as diminishing, as the US dedicated more and more resources to the “Pivot to Asia”. As if this wasn’t enough to reduce the confidence in the US’ security guarantee, Trump further discredited security provisions to Europe, claiming they were “free riders” on collective security, and went on to have friendly dialogues with Russia, Europe’s principal geopolitical threat (SZABO, 2018). With all that, it is untenable for Europe to rely on the US in the long term, because more Trump-like isolationist figures compromise the security guarantee. Thus, policy adjustments have been made to deepen Europe’s crisis response, as seen in the CDSP, PESCO, the European Peace Facility, and working together with NATO and EU partners in various exercises (WRIGHT, 2018). These are institutional victories, for them to be successful, incentives to deepen cooperation, national defense funding, leadership and military complementarities have to be present (RAND, 2019)
Financial flows from the US to Europe occurred mainly through the UK, the anglo-american axis enmeshed EU companies with the abundance of capital coming from the US. However, after the 2008 crisis, investments started to slow, and after Brexit, the EU can’t rely too much on US capital flows, already reducing the incentives to align with the US. Incentives to align are further reduced by American Industrial and Decoupling policies. Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act comes with protectionist measures that harm EU firms’ competitiveness. These measures don’t have an end in sight, and since it makes little sense to closely align with a country that harms your business, the EU should be even less drawn to align with the US. (LAVERY, SCHMID 2021).
To further increase autonomy on the business side of things, the EU launched their “Global Gateway” project. Essentially, the goal is to assist developing countries with green infrastructure and digitalization. A coalition of State and private resources is meant to fuel this project, that has clear geopolitical ambitions, and distinguishes itself from previous approaches by trying to build mutually beneficial agreements, rather than helping out (BARBERO, 2023). Enhancing your own capabilities to give yourself a fighting chance in a new global order is a clear signal that Strategic Autonomy is being actively pursued by the EU currently.
On the other hand, NATO still stands, and it would appear that the US still maintains a commitment to European defense, however shaky that has been in the recent past. Europe still seeks to deepen its crisis response capabilities, but, as of right now, still relies on the Americans for their defense. There is alignment on issues such as the war in Ukraine, or Taiwan, or the idea that China is a competitor, all of these things create opportunities for the EU to work with the US. That said, Europe isn’t jumping on board with economic decoupling, and autonomous capabilities are still being pursued.
Up until this point, it has been argued that Europe isn’t as fragmented as some analysts believe, nor is it a mere follower of US foreign policy objectives. How should the US and China deal with this fact? How is more or less fragmentation in the EU beneficial for these powers?
What would a fragmented EU mean for the US and China?
A more autonomous Europe isn’t necessarily what the US or China want, since decisions wouldn’t be bound by strategic dependencies. Michael Mazarr (2023) argues the US should like a strong ally in the EU, because Europe is connected to the Indo-Pacific, where the US is focusing its strategic vision, and can increase military strength through military cooperation and complementarities. Not just that, Europe can provide political support for normative initiatives and international institutions in areas such as climate change, AI and digital governance, for example (MAZZAR, 2023). It follows that the US should invest in a stronger NATO, and perhaps reappraise the levels of protectionism and the decoupling policy. Though, checking these boxes may be electorally inviable, and the next president may not be interested in doing so.
A system level analysis indicates that China could want to sow disunity in Europe to weaken an ally of their rival, the US. Especially when the question of Taiwan is on the table. China wants to reincorporate Taiwanese territory, something that the EU and the US strongly oppose. If the EU is weakened, it follows that there would be less resistance to Chinese military action in Taiwan (THE… 2023). However, improving Europe’s standing in the world stage to relatively weaken the US, pursuing multipolarity can also be beneficial, especially if the EU can engage more with China (which depends on the latter’s behavior). So it is unclear what would be more beneficial to China.
If the EU aims to be a global superpower, then global multipolarity would have to be the norm. And it would be ideal to have a reliable long-term partner in the US, but it's important to have checks and balances to Chinese power. And a world sculpted more and more in the vision of China wouldn’t go well with Europe’s normative preferences, that value democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law. So things are quite complicated for the EU, either way, improving Strategic Autonomy is the way to go. The importance of De-risking economic relations with China cannot be overstated here. It is only by safeguarding a European position while keeping economic prosperity that Strategic Autonomy can be achieved.
Final remarks
In this analysis, I argued that tendencies for fragmentation in the EU are overstated, and that it is unclear whether China benefits more from a more united or disunited Europe. I then argued that Mr. Macron’s fears of losing autonomy are unfounded, and that the EU continues to seek its own space in international affairs, defined by their own terms with their own capabilities. Then, I move on to consider how global superpowers China and America can interact with Europe and what Europe should do, concluding that it would be wise to continue to work with the US and De-risk with China.
It is always wise to see what global powers stand to gain from events in world affairs, navigating the world as the EU entails dealing with how China and the US deal with Europe. The extent to which Mr. Xi can really push for an advantage in European disunity shouldn't be overemphasized. However, Europe should seek to better organize their foreign policy to ensure that they stay economically relevant for the years to come, and working with the US can be just the way to do it, for the time being.
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